Category: Law

  • Unrest in Xinjiang

    The Times reports that 17 people were killed by rioters in Lukqun, Xinjiang Province, before police opened fie on the rioters and shot ten of them dead. The notion of China as a nation state is a very recent – at least by Chinese standards – one. Well into the last dynasty (Qing) China had no official borders as such. There were areas of Imperial control, and these faded into ‘barbarian lands’ beyond. Modern China has famously been described as a culture masquerading as a nation state.

    It was not until the arrival of the West that the Qing his can be understood in the context of the land grab that was taking place for China by nations such as Britain, France and Japan (all with colonies which bordered with China) as well as with Russia, with a long border with Russia. The best illustration of why demarcating the borders was needed is the case of Mongolia.

    The entire lands of Mongolia were once part of China. Today there is the sovereign state of Mongolia, and the autonomous region of Inner Mongolia, in northern China. The idea that the land closest to Beijing is called Inner Mongolia is clearly a sinocentric one. The modern state of Mongolia was formed in the 1920’s heavily influenced and encouraged by the Soviet Union. Russia had historically had similar aims in Xinjiang, whilst the British sought control over Tibet as an extension of their control of India.

    The fact that foreign powers were so aggressive in their attempts to acquire Chinese lands in part explains why modern China is so steadfast when it comes to issues of national sovereignty. China’s view of itself in terms of territory is one firmly routed in the Westphalian concept of nationhood. And although this is often a perspective not enjoyed by the West today, it was in fact the only conceptual framework available to the Chinese in which to respond to nineteenth century Western (and Japanese) aggression.

  • Bo Xilai – understanding the process

    In understanding the Bo Xilai case we need to first understand why the case is so important in China. Mr Bo was one of Chinas top ranking members of government, poised to take a seat on the all powerful Politburo Standing Committee. Although not tipped (or destined) for the top post, equivalent to Prime Minister in the UK, he was heading for one of the top positions in government, equivalent in the UK to being made Chancellor of the Exchequer, Home Secretary or Foreign Secretary – a position of considerable power, and why his case raises so many questions in China. But Mr Bo’s political career is no over as Xinhua Newsagency, the official newsagency of China, has announced that Bo Xilai is to be expelled from the Communist Party of China (CPC).

    The Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee decided at the meeting to expel Bo from the Party in accordance with the Party Constitution and CPC intra-party supervisory disciplinary regulations. The Party sanctions will be endorsed by the 7th plenary meeting of the 17th CPC Central Committee, which will be held ahead of the Party’s 18th National Congress set to convene on Nov. 8.

    The Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee has also decided to remove Bo from public office in accordance with the country’s Law on Public Servants and to transfer Bo’s suspected law violations and relevant evidence to judicial organs for handling.

    In short Bo Xilai is being expelled from the party, removed from office and allegations investigated by the police. It all seems straight forward enough (although this surface view masks the intense debates that must have happened within the Party before this course of action was finally agreed upon). It ends Mr Bo’s political career, and a long jail sentence is likely if he is found guilty.

    But to truly understand what has happened, and to understand why this matter is not as straight forward as it seems we need to understand the process – not simply the outcome. Key to this is understanding that for members of the CPC transgressions of the law are a matter of Party discipline, not legal process. That is to say, had Mr Bo remained a Party member, all the allegations could have been handled internally by the Party.

    It is easy to assume that the “transfer [of] Bo’s suspected law violations and relevant evidence to judicial organs for handling” is a natural part of the judicial process, as would be the case in the UK. It is not. There has already been an investigation, the case has been heard (by The Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee) and a judgment has been handed out – expulsion, removal from office and the case being handed over to the police. The Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee could have stopped at expulsion and removal had it so wished.

    When dealing with China it is important that we don’t simply transpose our own systems and processes to China. Even if, as in this case, things look very similar on the surface, differences in how things are done, said or approached, can be significant. Highlighting and explaining these differences lie at the heart of our China Training courses.

  • Blind Justice:? The case of Gu Kailai.

    Gu Kailai, wife of the popularist politician, Bo Xilai, former Provincial Governor of Chongqing, has been given a suspended death sentence for the murder of British businessman Neil Heywood. Ms Gu had confessed to the murder, claiming that Mr Heywood had threatened her son, allegedly over a disputed £13m compensation payment Mr Heywood was claiming. Ms Gu’s accomplice, Zhang Xiaojun, was sentenced to nine years.

    According to the Telegraph :

    However, the court explained it had suspended the sentence in light of Gu’s mental state, her admissions of guilt and remorse, and her cooperation with the investigation.

    China’s judiciary isn’t averse to handing out the death sentence, nor implementing it. There is widespread support in China for this modern version of China’s legalist tradition. Public opinion in Britain is generally against the death penalty, and certainly this is government policy. The Times reported that the British government had let known that it did not wish to see the death penalty applied in this case.

    I doubt whether the wishes of the British government played much part in the sentencing of Ms Gu; if the British government couldn’t prevent the implementation of the death penalty on a British subject, then it is difficult to imagine it would have much success in influencing the outcome for a Chinese citizen.

    There’s a marked cultural difference, one we can recognise and accept as something we agree to disagree upon – in the same way as we do with the US. Yet trying to influence the outcome of Ms Gu’s sentence is perhaps a step too far. Certainly it seems difficult to justify why murderers of British subjects should be exempt from the death sentence! It flies in the face of the treasured belief that justice is blind.